Fairway Distributing Co. v. Bangerton Construction Company and John mark Bangerter : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1989
Fairway Distributing Co. v. Bangerton
Construction Company and John mark Bangerter :
Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Merlin O. Baker; Ray Quinney and Nebeker; James T. Ferrini; Richard P. Winter; Edward T. Kay;
Clausen, Miller, Gorman Caffrey .
Shawn E. Draney; Snow, Christensen and Martineau; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation














BANGERTER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY; JOHN MARK BANGERTER 
BONNEVILLE ENGINEERING, INC.; TRUSWAL SYSTEMS, INC. 





JOHN MARK BANGERTER, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY; CNA INSURANCE COMPANIES; TRUCK 
INSURANCE EXCHANGE and FARMERS INSURANCE GROUP, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT 
DIEHL LUMBER COMPANY 
Appeal From the Final Judgment Of 
The Second Judicial District Court of Davis County, 
The Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby Presiding 
MERLIN 0. BAKER 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
400 Deseret Building 
79 South Main 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
and 
JAMES T. FERRINI, RICHARD P. WINTER 
and EDWARD T. KAY of the firm 
CLAUSEN, MILLER, GORMAN 
CAFFREY & WITOUS, P.C. 
10 South LaSalle Street 
Chicago, Illinois 60603 
Telephone: (312) 855-1010 
Attorneys for Respondents 
SHAWN E. DRANEY 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Attorneys for Defendant^Apge^L lajfew 
Diehl Lumber Company L , 
Telephone: (801) 5 2 1 - $ 0 0 
JAN241S89 
Lb* 
PHILLIP S. FERGUSON 
CHRISTENSEN, J E N S E l O T P j ^ W S l o ^ Court. Hi*"" 
510 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent 
Truswall Systems, Inc. 
Telephone: (801) 355-3431 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 




BANGERTER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY; JOHN MARK BANGERTER; 
BONNEVILLE ENGINEERING, INC.; TRUSWAL SYSTEMS, INC. 
(Respondent); COLONIAL LUMBER, INC.; and DIEHL LUMBER 
COMPANY (Appellant), 
Defendants. 
JOHN MARK BANGERTER, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY; CNA INSURANCE COMPANIES; TRUCK 
INSURANCE EXCHANGE and FARMERS INSURANCE GROUP, 
No. 880076 
Third-Party Defendants. 
REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT 
DIEHL LUMBER COMPANY 
Appeal From the Final Judgment Of 
The Second Judicial District Court of Davis County, 
The Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby Presiding 
MERLIN 0. BAKER 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
400 Deseret Building 
79 South Main 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
and 
JAMES T. FERRINI, RICHARD P. WINTER 
and EDWARD T. KAY of the firm 
CLAUSEN, MILLER, GORMAN 
CAFFREY & WITOUS, P.C. 
10 South LaSalle Street 
Chicago, Illinois 60603 
Telephone: (312) 855-1010 
Attorneys for Respondents 
Fairway Distributing Company 
SHAWN E. DRANEY 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
Diehl Lumber Company 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
PHILLIP S. FERGUSON 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
510 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent 
Truswall Systems, Inc. 
Telephone: (801) 355-3431 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
ARGUMENT 1 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT HAD NO DISCRETION TO 
AMEND ITS ORDER TWENTY TWO MONTHS AFTER 
IT WAS ENTERED 1 
POINT II 
EVEN IF THE COURT HAD DISCRETION TO ALTER 
ITS EARLIER ORDER, IT ABUSED THAT DISCRETION 
POINT III 
ONE WHO NEGOTIATES THE SALE OF PRODUCTS 
BETWEEN BUYER AND SELLER IS NOT STRICTLY 
LIABLE FOR DEFECTS IN THOSE PRODUCTS 10 
POINT IV 
FAIRWAY'S ASSERTION THAT DIEHL DID NOT 
ADEQUATELY OBJECT TO INSTRUCTION 15 IS 
WITHOUT MERIT 21 
POINT V 
FAIRWAY'S CLAIM THAT DIEHL WAS "AFFORDED 
THE OPPORTUNITY TO FULLY LITIGATE THE ISSUE 
OF TRUSWAL'S FAULT AT TRIAL" IS IN ERROR . . . 23 
CONCLUSION 24 
-i-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES Page 
Abco Metals Corp. v. J.W. Imports Co., 
560 F. Supp. 125 (N.D.I11. 1982) 15 
Barry v. Stevens Equip. Co., 176 Ga.App. 27, 
335 S.E.2d 129 (1985) 15 
Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664, P.2d 455 
(Utah 1983) 4 
Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 
(Utah 1985) 6 
Bolduc v. Herbert Schneider Corp., 117 N.H. 566, 
374 A.2d 1187 (1977) 16 
Brejcha v. Wilson Machinery, Inc., 160 Cal.App.3d 
630, 206 Cal.Rptr. 688 (Cal.App.Ct. 1984) . . 10 
Castaldo v. Pittsburqh-Des Moines Steel Co. Inc., 
376 A.2d 88 (Del.Supr. 1977); 18 
Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817 
(Utah App. 1988) 3 
Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 
45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965) 17 
Dixon v. Four Seasons Bowling Alley, Inc., 
176 N.J.Super. 540, 424 A.2d 428 (1980) . . . 16 
Drury v. Lunceford, 18 Utah 2d 74, 
415 P.2d 662 (1966) 2 
Gakiya v. Hallmark Props., Inc., 722 P.2d 460 
(Haw. 1986) 10 
Garcia v. Halsett, 3 Cal.App.3d 319, 
82 Cal.Rptr. 420 (1970) 16 
Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983) . . . . 3 
Goode v. Dayton Disposal, Inc., 738 P.2d 638 
(Utah 1987) 24 
-ii-
Page 
Hammond v. North American Asbestos Corp., 
97 111.2d 195, 454 N.E.2d 210 (1983) 11, 12 
Hammond v. North American Asbestos Corp., 
105 Ill.App.3d 1033, 435 N.E.2d 540 
(Ill.App.Ct. 1982) 12 
Hanover, Ltd. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 
758 P. 2d 443 (Utah App. 1988) 5 
Hinojasa v. Automatic Elevator Co., 92 I11.App.3d 
351, 416 N.E.2d 45 (Ill.App.Ct. 1980) . . . . 15 
Hoffman v. Loos & Dilworth, Inc., 307 Pa. Super. 
131, 452 A.2d 1349 (1982) 13 
Hoover v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 270 Ore. 
498, 528 P.2d 76 (1974) 16 
Huang v. Garner, 157 Cal.App.3d 404, 203 Cal.Rptr. 
800 (Cal.App.Ct. 1984) 17 
Jahnke v. Palomar Financial Corp., 22 Ariz.App. 
369, 527 P.2d 771 (1974) 7 
Keen v. Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc., 
49 111.App.3d 480, 364 N.E.2d 502 
(Ill.App.Ct. 1977) 16 
Kelly v. Utah Power & Light, 
746 P.2d 1189 (Utah App. 1987) 4 
Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 N.J.Super. 228, 
227 A.2d 539 (N.J.Co. 1967) 13 
North Eastern Mining Co. v. Dorothy Coal Sales, 
Inc. , 108 F.R.D. 657 (D.Ind. 1985) 1 
Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 
214 (Utah 1984) 6, 7 
Puckett v. Cook, 586 P.2d 721 (Okl. 1978) 3 
-iii-
Page 
Ruiz v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co., 97 N.M. 194, 
638 P.2d 406 (N.M. App. 1981) 16 
Siciliano v. Capital City Shows, Inc., 124 N.H. 
719, 475 A.2d 19 (1984) 16 
Silverheart v. Mount Zion Hosp., 
20 Cal.App.3d 1022, 98 Cal.Rptr. 187 
(Cal.App.Ct. 1971) 14 
Swenson Trucking & Excavating, Inc. v. Truckweld 
Equip. Co., 604 P.2d 1113 (Alaska 1980) . . . 15 
Taylor v. E.M. Royle Corp., 264 P.2d 279 
(Utah 1953) 4 
Tripp v. Vaughn, 746 P.2d 794 (Utah App. 1987) . . 3 
Unigard Ins. Co. v. City of LaVerkin, 689 P.2d 1344 
(Utah 1984) 5 
Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. v. Tolbert, 
16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965) 2 
Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal.App.2d 256, 
37 Cal.Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d 168 (1964) . . . . 5 
Wagner v. Coronet Hotel, 10 Ariz.App. 296, 458 P.2d 
390 (Ariz.App. 1969) 16 
Weber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 630 F. Supp. 285 
(D.N.J. 1986) 13 
Zamora v. Mobile Corp., 101 Wash.2d 199, 
704 P.2d 584 (1985) 12 
STATUTES Page 
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-402 (1987) 18 
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 411.340 
(Michie/Robbs-Merrill Supp. 1988) 18 
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21, 181 (1943) 18 
-iv-
Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-106 (Supp. 1988) 18 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-100 (1953) 5 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-106(l) (1953) 19 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1953) 5 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-725 (1953) 7 
Utah Comparative Negligence Act, 1973 Utah Laws, 
Ch. 209 §3 5 
RULES 
U.R.Civ.P. 14 7, 9 
U.R.Civ.P. 60 1, 8 
OTHER 
Annot., 28 A.L.R.4th 326 (1984) 15 
Annot., 29 A.L.R.3d 1425 (1970) 15 
Annot., 54 A.L.R.3d 258 (1974) 15 
2 L. Frumer & M. Freedman, Products Liability 
§ 3.03[4][iv], pp. 3-444 through 3-447 (1988). 16 
3 L. Frumer & M. Freedman, Products Liability 
§ 9.09[2], p. 9-437 (1988) 19 
3 L. Frumer & M. Freedman, Products Liability, 




THE DISTRICT COURT HAD NO DISCRETION TO 
AMEND ITS ORDER TWENTY TWO MONTHS AFTER IT 
WAS ENTERED. 
In a written order dated August 23, 1985, the district 
court gave Fairway 15 days to file a verified factual statement. 
(Adden. A.) On September 11, 1985, the district court wrote: 
On August 23, 1985, this court ordered the plaintiffs 
to file a verified factual statement about each party 
to be added. The court allowed the plaintiffs 15 days 
to file the document. Nineteen days have passed and 
no document has been filed with the court. 
The motion to amend is denied. 
(Adden. B.) Twenty-two months later the district court amended 
that order. (R. 753-755, 787-792.) 
Rule 60 governs the amendment of orders. In its "Motion to 
Correct the Court Order or in the Alternative to Amend the 
Complaint to Include the Cause of Action Based on Strict 
Liability" and supporting memoranda, (Adden. C ) , Fairway 
appropriately invoked and cited Rule 60(b). Fairway claimed 
excusable neglect. Rule 60(b) grants no discretion to the 
district court to alter an order for the reason of excusable 
neglect after 30 days. 
Fairway now claims Rule 15 applies. When there is conflict 
between rules, the more specific rule applies. See, e.g., North 
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Eastern Mining Co. v. Dorothy Coal Sales, Inc., 108 F.R.D. 657, 
659 (D.Ind. 1985). Rule 60 is the more specific rule, and 
serves an important function in preserving the orderly, effi-
cient administration of justice. 
It is true that our new rules of civil procedure were 
intended to eliminate undue emphasis on technicalities 
and to provide liberality in procedure to the end that 
disputes be heard and determined on their merits. How-
ever, this does not mean that procedure before the 
courts has become entirely "without form and void." 
The law itself is a system of rules designed to safe-
guard rights and preserve order, and administration of 
justice under it must necessarily be carried on with 
some degree or order. This can be accomplished only 
by compliance with the rules established for that 
purpose. Liberality in their interpretation and appli-
cation should be indulged where no prejudice or dis-
advantage to anyone results, but where failure to 
comply with the rules will result in some substantial 
prejudice or disadvantage to a party, they should be 
adhered to with fidelity. 
Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. v. Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 
P.2d 703, 704 (1965) (footnotes omitted). 
Even though the new rules of procedure had as a part 
of their purpose the removing of undue technicalities 
and rigidities in the law, and are to be liberally 
construed to effectuate justice, nevertheless, they 
were designed to provide a pattern of regularity of 
procedure which the parties and the courts could 
follow and rely upon. 
Drury v. Lunceford, 18 Utah 2d 74, 415 P.2d 662, 663 (1966). 
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POINT II 
EVEN IF THE COURT HAD DISCRETION TO ALTER ITS 
EARLIER ORDER, IT ABUSED THAT DISCRETION. 
Fairway claims Diehl's burden is "insurmountable," in other 
words, this court is powerless to review the discretionary acts 
of the district court. Fairway's claim is erroneous. 
In cases where abuse of discretion is raised [the 
appellate court] will review the discretionary act 
and, if abuse is involved, correct the abuse. 
Puckett v. Cook, 586 P.2d 721, 723 (Okl. 1978). 
Fairway's Motion to Correct the Court Order or in the Alter-
native to Amend the Complaint to Include a Cause of Action Based 
on Strict Liability was filed on June 16, 1987, (Adden. C ) , 40 
months after the claim arose, 31 months after the Complaint was 
filed, following 2 pretrial hearings, and a little more than 1 
month before trial. When a party seeks to amend the pleadings 
late and on the eve of trial, the trial court must require a 
reasonable explanation of the delay. Girard v. Appleby, 660 
P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983); Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817, 
820 (Utah App. 1988); Tripp v. Vaughn, 746 P.2d 794, 797-98 
(Utah App. 1987). 
Fairway has never attempted to give an explanation of why a 
strict liability claim was not stated in the original complaint. 
Fairway alleged the closely related claim of breach of warranty, 
which requires a sale. Why could it not have alleged strict 
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liability, which Fairway claims requires little more than a 
remote involvement in the sale of a product? Fairway is unable 
to give a reasonable explanation of the delay in seeking an 
amendment of the 1985 Order. 
The trial court must next consider whether prejudice would 
occur by allowing the amendment. Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 
664, P.2d 455, 464 (Utah 1983); Kelly v. Utah Power & Light, 
746 P.2d 1189, 1190 (Utah App. 1987). 
It is true that our new rules should be "liberally 
construed" to secure a "just . . . determination of 
every action", but they do not represent a one-way 
street down which but one litigant may travel. The 
rules allow locomotion in both directions by all 
interested travelers. They allow plaintiffs consi-
derable latitude in pleading and proof, to the point 
where some people have expressed the opinion that 
careless legal craftsmanship has been invited rather 
than discouraged. Be that as it may, a defendant must 
be extended every reasonable opportunity to prepare 
his case and to meet an adversary's claims. Also he 
must be protected against surprise and be assured 
equal opportunity and facility to present and prove 
counter contentions, - else unilateral justice and 
injustice would result sufficient to raise serious 
doubts as to constitutional due process guarantees. 
Taylor v. E.M. Royle Corp., 2 Utah 2d 175, 264 P.2d 279, 280 
(1953) (quoting Rule 1(a) U.R.Civ.P.). 
The district court acknowledged that Diehl was prejudiced 
by the amendment, (Adden. D.), and delayed the trial 3 months 
in an effort to minimize that prejudice. Unfortunately, no 
amount of delay in the trial could reduce the prejudice. 
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One of the justifications for extending strict liability to 
sellers other than the manufacturer is that there is little 
prejudice to those sellers because the loss can be passed by 
those sellers to the manufacturer. See e.g., Vandermark v. 
Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal.2d 256, 37 Cal.Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d 168, 
172 (1964). The Utah Court of Appeals has now made that right 
of indemnity very significant. A remote seller can recover 
attorneys fees, costs and any liability to the plaintiff. 
Hanover Ltd. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 758 P.2d 443 (Utah App. 
1988). Fairway's unreasonable delay destroyed Diehl's indem-
nity right. 
The warehouse in question was constructed in 1979. The 
trusses in question were made in July, 1979. As of July, 1986, 
Diehl's claim for indemnity against Truss Teck was barred by 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1953). 
Truss Teck was dissolved on December 31, 1984. (T.R. 318; 
Def. Ex. 2, R. 1570.) As of December 31, 1986, Diehl's indem-
nity claim against Truss Teck was barred by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 16-10-100 (1953). Had Fairway raised a strict liability 
claim before July 1986, Diehl could have and would have 
asserted a claim for indemnity against Truss Teck. 
A claim for contribution "arises" only when a defendant 
pays more than his fair share. Uniqard Ins. Co. v. City of 
LaVerkin, 689 P.2d 1344, 1346 (Utah 1984); Utah Comparative 
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Negligence Act, 1973 Utah Laws Ch. 209, § 3. An indemnity 
claim "does not arise until the liability of the party seeking 
indemnity results in his damage." Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale 
Supply, Co., 681 P.2d 214, 218 (Utah 1984). A statute of 
limitation ordinarily does not begin to run until a claim 
"accrues" or "arises". This, however, has nothing to do with 
statutes of repose, which begin to run regardless of when the 
claim arises: 
Statutes of repose . . . are different from statute of 
limitations . . . . A statute of limitations requires 
a lawsuit to be filed within a specified period of time 
after a legal right has been violated or the remedy 
for the wrong committed is deemed waived. A statute 
of repose bars all actions after a specified period of 
time has run from the occurrence of some event other 
than the occurrence of an injury that gives rise to a 
cause of action. 
Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 672 (Utah 1985) 
(citations omitted). 
A specific statutory limitation period that seeks 
ultimate repose of causes of action will control over 
a general statute of limitations, even to cut off an 
indemnity action that technically has not accrued. 
Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214, 218 (Utah 
1984). 
Fairway claims that Diehl chose not to sue Truss Teck 
because the president of Diehl was the father of the president 
of Truss Teck. Fairway's attempt at clairvoyance is in error. 
If Diehl were not insured against liability, its officers and 
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directors would owe a fiduciary responsibility to shareholders 
to seek indemnity, irrespective of their personal feelings. 
Since Diehl does have liability insurance, the insurance car-
rier has the right to direct the defense and it could have, and 
would have, insisted upon a claim of indemnity regardless of 
Larry Diehl1s asserted altruism. 
Diehl never had any exposure until the strict liability 
claim, as this appeal well illustrates. 
As Fairway has admitted, there never was any evidence of 
Diehl's negligence or breach of warranty. At most, any claim 
of Diehl against Truss Teck on the negligence claim would have 
been for contribution, not indemnity. Diehl had no claim 
against Truss Teck on the warranty claim, as Diehl did not 
purchase the trusses from Truss Teck. Any warranty claims 
against Diehl or Truss Teck were barred by the Statute of Repose 
found in Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-725 (1953), even before Fairway 
filed its original complaint. Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply 
Co., 681 P.2d 214, 218 (Utah 1984). 
Diehl's claim of indemnity against Truss Teck never even 
accrued before the judgment. Ordinarily, claims cannot be 
raised before they accrue. E.g., Jahnke v. Palomar Financial 
Corp., 22 Ariz.App. 369, 527 P.2d 771, 775 (1974). There is, 
by rule, an exception to this principle. Rule 14 allows a 
defendant to "cause a summons and complaint to be served upon a 
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person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him 
for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him." There 
is no similar provision which allows a defendant to file a 
third-party complaint seeking contribution or indemnity for a 
claim which may, possibly, someday be stated by the plaintiff. 
The rule applies only after the plaintiff has stated the claim 
for which indemnity is sought. 
Diehl, like the district court, assumed that if Fairway was 
serious about amending its complaint, it would have complied 
with the court's order of September 11, 1985: 
The court assumed that if the plaintiff had been 
serious about the cause of action, counsel would have 
filed the required statement. 
(Adden. D.) 
Diehl assumed that Fairway would be required to comply with 
Rule 60. Diehl assumed Fairway would be required to act timely. 
Diehl assumes, even now, that the "rules" of civil procedure are 
something more than mere suggestions. Diehl also assumed that 
if Fairway had been serious about the strict liability claim, 
Fairway would have sued Truss Teck. While Truss Teck was dis-
solved in 1984, there may well have been insurance coverage or 
traceable assets. 
Fairway champions a double standard. It says it was reason-
able for it to have made an "assumption" - unsupported by any 
record before this court - that the district court had dealt 
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with the proposed amended complaint in portions, rather than as 
a whole, and that the court had dealt with the strict liability 
claim differently than the claims against new parties. This, 
despite a written order to the contrary. If Fairway really 
believed it had raised a strict liability claim, why didn't it 
insist on an answer to that claim? 
Fairway, on the other hand, claims it was unreasonable for 
Diehl to rely upon the written order of the court, the plead-
ings, and the rules of civil procedure in failing to assert a 
claim that had not accrued, might never do so, and could not be 
filed under Rule 14. 
Fairway's claim before this court is: Fairway is to be 
excused for failing to read the court's written order. Diehl 
is to be dammed for failing to read the mind of Fairway's 
counsel. 
The loss of its indemnity rights is not the only prejudice 
suffered by Diehl. Fairway's strict liability claim came 8 
years after the trusses were made and 40 months after the acci-
dent. In that time, witnesses died, memories dimmed, busines-
ses dissolved, and business records were lost or destroyed. 
Neither 3 months, nor 3 years of additional discovery could 
have cured that prejudice. 
Abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court: 
1. exceeds bounds of reason; 
2. disregards rules; or 
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3. disregards principles of law or practice, to the 
detriment of a party litigant. E.g., Gakiya v. Hallmark 
Props. , Inc., 722 P.2d 460, 463 (Haw. 1986). 
Here the district court: 
1. exceeded the bounds of reason; 
2. disregarded Rule 60; 
3. disregarded the rule of law requiring it to deny 
amendment absent a reasonable explanation of the delay from 
Fairway; and 
4. ignored patent and unavoidable prejudice to Diehl. 
POINT III 
ONE WHO NEGOTIATES THE SALE OF PRODUCTS 
BETWEEN BUYER AND SELLER IS NOT STRICTLY 
LIABLE FOR DEFECTS IN THOSE PRODUCTS. 
Persons who negotiate a sale between buyer and seller are 
not strictly liable for defects in the goods sold. See, 
Brejcha v. Wilson Machinery, Inc., 160 Cal.App.3d 630, 206 
Cal.Rptr. 688, (Cal.App.Ct. 1984). In that case, the 
California Court of Appeals held an auctioneer who received a 
metal-rolling machine on consignment and advertised and sold 
the machine, "as is", as the agent of the seller, was not 
strictly liable for defects in the machine. The court based 
its decision on the fact that the defendant had not taken title 
to the machine and had not made any warranties or 
representations. 206 Cal.Rptr. at 694. 
-10-
Fairway claims a great deal of authority for the proposition 
that a "broker" is strictly liable. Careful examination of 
those cases discloses no such support. 
Fairway claims the Illinois Supreme Court in Hammond v. 
North American Asbestos Corp., 97 111.2d 195, 454 N.E.2d 210 
(1983), found the defendant strictly liable "because it acted 
as a sole sales agent for Cape's [Cape Asbestos Company, the 
manufacturer] product." Fairway does not mention that the 
defendant was the wholly owned subsidiary of Cape. Id. at 
213. While the defendant claimed to be only a broker, ^d. at 
216, it does not appear that position was accepted by either 
the jury or the Illinois Supreme Court: 
Defendant's annual reports to the Secretary of State 
of Illinois from 1955 to 1961 listed defendant's 
business as the manufacture and sale of asbestos. 
Many of the documents were submitted by plaintiff to 
prove that defendants sold large quantities of raw 
asbestos to Calabrian Industries (Calabrian) a barter 
corporation. . . 
Joan Holtze, a former employee of defendant from 1953 
until 1978, testified defendant was incorporated to be 
a contact point in north America for Cape customers. 
While admitting defendant made a few direct sales of 
asbestos, she said it primarily functioned as a message 
relay center between Cape and Cape's North American 
Asbestos' customers . . . . 
One of defendant's former presidents testified that 
defendant neither accepted any orders or contracts for 
asbestos on behalf of Cape nor had authority to do so. 
He acknowledged, though, that he represented defendant 
as its attorney in the preparation and negotiation of 
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the agreement with Calabrian to supply asbestos under 
the barter contracts . . . . 
Id. at 213-14. 
The court in Hammond never discussed whether a broker could 
be held strictly liable. It simply held: 
There was ample evidence from which the jury could 
conclude defendant's role in marketing the asbestos 
was sufficient to support liability under strict 
liability theory. 
Id. at 217. 
The Illinois Court of Appeals unequivocally rejected the 
argument that the defendant was a broker: 
Irrespective of defendant's role in the marketing of 
asbestos in its normal course of business, this argu-
ment ignores the evidence adduced concerning the gov-
ernment contract sales. The testimony and documents 
disclose that Calabrian directly negotiated contracts 
between defendant and itself to supply asbestos for the 
federal government's stockpile of critical materials. 
Thus, insofar as the government contract sales are con-
cerned, defendant became a seller within the meaning 
of the Restatement for which liability attaches. 
Hammond v. North American Asbestos Corp., 105 Ill.App.3d 1033, 
435 N.E.2d 540, 544-45 (Ill.App.Ct. 1982). 
Fairway claims the defendant in Zamora v. Mobile Corp., 101 
Wash. 2d 199, 704 P.2d 584 (1985), "was a broker of propane 
gas." That description is in error. The defendant in Zamora 
purchased and resold the product on its own behalf, not as 
another's agent: 
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Significantly, respondent never had possession or 
control of the propane here. It bought and sold the 
gas completely as a paper transaction. 
Id. at 587. The court found a sale had occurred and the de-
fendant was a "seller" within the meaning of 402A. 
Fairway represents that the defendant, Pacor, in Weber v. 
Johns-Manville Corp., 630 F. Supp. 285 (D.N.J. 1986), was a 
"broker" a "voice over the phone" and that the brokerage service 
"was an isolated and limited feature of its overall business.1' 
Fairway's interpretation is in error. The court in Weber framed 
the issue as follows: 
[W]e are called upon to predict what a New Jersey 
court would do if confronted with the two critical 
issues presented here, namely, whether self-styled 
mere brokers may be held strictly liable in tort and, 
perhaps more fundamentally, whether Pacor is in fact a 
"mere broker." 
Id. at 286. The court never reached the first issue. 
Pacor was not an ordinary broker or, to use Story's 
words, "strictly a middleman." . . . Against this 
background it would be a mischaracterization of the 
record to characterize Pacor as a "mere broker;" 
perhaps "broker plus" would be more apropos. In any 
event, because the mere broker label does not apply, 
Pacor's motion premised on that notion need not be 
addressed further and will be denied. 
Id. at 287-88 (emphasis in original). 
The Weber case is the only case cited by Fairway where the 
court clearly defined the term "broker." 
The only "broker" case cited by Fairway which appears to 
give some support to Fairway's position is Hoffman v. Loos & 
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Dilworth, Inc., 307 Pa.Super. 131, 452 A.2d 1349 (1982). The 
holding in that case, however, is far from clear. In that case 
the plaintiff's decedent received fatal injuries in a fire 
caused by rags soaked in linseed oil. The plaintiffs sued Loos 
& Dilworth, Inc., which filed claims against Honeymead Products 
Company, C.J. Osborn Chemicals Company and E.W. Kaufmann 
Company. The trial court granted Kaufmann summary judgment. 
Loos & Dilworth and Honeymead appealed. Loos & Dilworth and 
Honeymead claimed Kaufmann had purchased, taken title to and 
resold the linseed oil in question. id. at 1352 n. 1. E.W. 
Kaufmann claimed it usually took title to linseed oil it resold, 
but did not do so with respect to oil sold to Loos & Dilworth. 
id. at 1353 n. 2. 
The appellate court reversed the summary judgment. The 
court, however, does not appear to have resolved the issue of 
whether Kaufmann actually purchased and resold the linseed oil 
on its own behalf. 
The tort law of Utah is, with few exceptions, based upon the 
principals of negligence. Fairway claims the exceptions have 
swallowed the rule. Such an assertion is simply unsupportable. 
For example, courts have generally denied application of 
strict liability to hospitals or medical practitioners for in-
juries suffered from medical products used in treatment. In 
Silverheart v. Mount Zion Hosp., 20 Cal.App.3d 1022, 98 Cal. 
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Rptr. 187 (Cal.App.Ct. 1971), the court rejected the 
application of strict liability to a hospital in an action by a 
patient injured when a surgical needle broke. In Magrine v. 
Krasnica, 94 N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 538, aff'd, Magrine v. 
Spector, 53 N.J. 259, 250 A.2d 129, (N.J. 1969) the court 
refused to impose strict liability upon a dentist who's patient 
received injuries when a hypodermic needle broke. See also 
Annot., 54 A.L.R.3d 258 (1974). 
Generally, the courts have refused to apply strict liability 
to financing lessors. E.g., Abco Metals Corp. v. J.W. Imports 
Co., 560 F. Supp. 125 (N.D.I11. 1982) aff'd, Abco Metal Corp. 
v. Equico Lessors, Inc., 721 F.2d 583 (7th Cir. 1983) (applying 
Illinois law). See also, Annot. 28 A.L.R.4th 326 (1984). 
While there is some authority to the contrary, persons who 
overhaul or rebuild products and place them back into service 
are not strictly liable for defects. E.g., Barry v. Stevens 
Equip. Co., 176 Ga.App. 27, 335 S.E.2d 129 (1985); Swenson 
Trucking & Excavating, Inc. v. Truckweld Equip. Co., 604 P.2d 
1113, 1116-17 (Alaska 1980); See also, Annot., 29 A.L.R.3d 
1425 (1970). 
While there may be authority to the contrary, installers 
have generally not been held strictly liable for defects in 
products installed, even where the products are of no use unless 
and until installed. E.g., Hinojasa v. Automatic Elevator Co., 
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92 Ill.App.3d 351, 416 N.E.2d 45, 47-48 (Ill.App.Ct. 1980); 
Hoover v. Montgomery Ward & Co. Inc., 270 Ore. 498, 528 P.2d 76 
(1974). 
Generally, strict liability has not been extended to persons 
who provide products for transportation where there is no sale. 
For example, strict liability was held not to apply to the owner 
of a ski tram in Bolduc v. Herbert Schneider Corp., 117 N.H. 
566, 374 A.2d 1187 (1977). In Ruiz v. Southern Pacific Transp. 
Co., 97 N.M. 194, 638 P.2d 406, 411-12 (N.M.App. 1981), a 
person injured by a freight train could not recover under a 
theory of strict liability. See also, Siciliano v. Capital 
City Shows, Inc., 124 N.A. 719, 475 A.2d 19, 25 (1984) 
(amusement ride). 
Fairway claims "licensors" are strictly liable and cites for 
this proposition the case of Garcia v. Halsett, 3 Cal. App. 3d 
319, 82 Cal.Rptr. 420 (1970), where a young boy was injured by 
a washing machine at a local laundry mat. That position does 
not appear to have wide acceptance. See, Siciliano v. Capital 
City Shows, Inc., 124 N.H. 719, 475 A.2d 19, 25 (1984) (amuse-
ment ride); Keen v. Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc., 49 111.App.3d 
480, 364 N.E.2d 502, 504-05 (Ill.App.Ct. 1977) (strict liability 
does not apply to a grocery store customer injured by shopping 
cart). Wagner v. Coronet Hotel, 10 Ariz.App. 296, 458 P.2d 
390, 394-95 (Ariz. App. 1969) (hotel not strictly liable when 
guest injured by defective bath mat); Dixon v. Four Seasons 
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Bowling Alley, Inc., 176 N.J.Super. 540, 424 A.2d 428, 430-31 
(1980) (bowling alley not strictly liable for defects in 
bowling ball made available for use by patrons). 
At least one student of products of liability does not share 
Fairway's view of the explosion in strict liability: 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts provision on strict 
liability in tort imposes the liability on one who 
sells a product in a defective condition unreasonably 
dangerous to the use or consumer. It limits its appli-
cation to a seller who is engaged in the business of 
selling such products and the cases where it is expec-
ted to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it was sold. 
Under this rule, the sale of a chattel is an element 
of its application. In the discussion which has pre-
ceded this section, it was pointed out that in some 
instances strict liability in tort has been applied 
even though there was no sale. The most common sit-
uation of this is the case of a lease of goods, as 
demonstrated by the Cintrone [(Cintrone v. Hertz Truck 
Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 
(1965)] decision. But the departure from the Restate-
ment rule to achieve this strict liability result is 
not particularly startling since that case involved a 
lessor whose business it was to put goods into the 
stream of commerce by leases instead of through sales 
transactions. In other words, the case did involve a 
situation of the distribution of goods. 
Without a sale, and aside from the type of case in-
volved in Cintrone, cases have been very sparce in 
applying strict liability in tort. 
2 L. Frumer & M. Freedman, Products Liability § 3.03[4][vi], 
pp. 3-444 through 3-447 (1988). 
People who design or engineer products without manufac-
turing them are not strictly liable. See, Huang v. Garner, 157 
Cal.App.3d 404, 203 Cal.Rptr. 800, 804 n. 5 (Cal.App.Ct. 1984); 
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Castaldo v. Pittsburqh-Des Moines Steel Co. Inc., 376 A.2d 88, 
90-91 (Del.Supr. 1977). 
Fairway tries to create more exceptions to the general rule 
of negligence law than actually exist. Fairway claims that 
"distributors" and "importers" are also examples of strictly 
liable nonsellers. Careful examination of the cases cited by 
Fairway reveals that the "importers" and "distributors" were 
simply sellers. 
Contrary to Fairway's assertions, there appears to be at 
least a legislative trend toward restricting the application of 
strict liability to manufacturers. Colorado, Kentucky, Nebraska 
and Tennessee have statutes which limit the application of 
strict liability to manufacturers, at least where the manu-
facturer is subject to service of process and solvent. Colo. 
Rev. Stat. § 13-21-402 (1987); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 411.340 
(Michie/Robbs-Merrill Supp. 1988); Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-106 
(Supp. 1988); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21, 181 (1943). 
The proposed Model Uniform Product Liability Act imposes 
strict liability on a nonmanufacturing seller only if that 
seller makes an express warranty or the manufacturer has been 
judicially declared insolvent or the court determines it is 
highly probably the claimant would be unable to enforce a 
judgment against the manufacturer. 3 L. Frumer & M. Freedman, 
Products Liability, § 9.02[2], p. 9-45 (1988). 
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The proposed federal Product Liability Reform Act of 1986 
does not impose liability upon nonmanufacturing sellers unless 
those sellers had a reasonable opportunity to inspect the 
product and reasonably should have discovered the defect, or 
the manufacturer is not subject to service, or the court deter-
mines the claimant would be unable to enforce a judgment against 
the manufacturer. 3 L. Frumer & M. Freedman, Products Liabil-
ity, § 9.09[2], p. 9-437 (1988). 
Fairway argues that lessors and bailors do not "sale" 
products. In layman's terms that may be correct. In legal 
terms, that is a very simplistic view: 
A "sale'1 consists of the passing of title from the 
seller to the buyer for a price . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-106(l) (1953). 
This section does not say that fee simple absolute title 
need be conveyed, although that is certainly a laymen's view of 
the term "sale." A title interest may involve a leasehold 
interest. Courts have expanded the term "seller" consistent 
with the Anglo-American concept that property title consists of 
a bundle of divisible rights. Courts have not divorced strict 
liability completely from the concept of title, or the law of 
warranty from whence it sprang. Strict liability should be 
limited to those who convey some title and make some implied 
representations of quality. 
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Instead of this concrete and understandable test, Fairway 
suggests the following shibboleth: "Participation in the chain 
of distribution." 
If the "chain" referred to is not the chain of title or the 
chain of possession, what does this mean? Does the worker on 
the production line "participate in the chain of distribu-
tion?" Does the trucker that hauls the product "participate in 
the chain of distribution"? Does the bank that finances the 
dealer's purchase of products and factors accounts receivables 
"participate in the chain of distribution"? Does the retail 
sales clerk "participate in the chain of distribution". Without 
these people, products cannot move from manufacturer to user in 
today's world. 
Fairways test if tautological. We first decide if strict 
liability should be imposed, then we recant the shibboleth: the 
defendant "participated in the chain of distribution." 
Without the requirement of a sale, there is no rational way 
to exclude the application of strict liability to those who 
provide services. Does a doctor provide a hypodermic needle, 
or services? Does the professional engineer who designs a 
product provide services, or the product? Does an auctioneer 
provide a service or the items sold? Does a broker provide the 
service of getting buyer and seller together, or a product? 
Does the individual car salesman provide a service or the car? 
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The answer, of course, depends upon semantics. Without the 
requirement of a sale, the application of strict liability will 
be limitless. 
Fairway is critical of Diehl's insistence that this court 
at least examine the public policy of strict liability. Again 
Fairway adopts a simplistic approach: what's best for the con-
sumer is "the ultimate," the beginning and the end, all that 
matters. 
It sometimes seems that the obvious has escaped those 
dealing with strict liability. This court cannot make the loss 
in question go away, it can only reassign it. Fairway would 
have this court create a chosen class, "the consumer," who can 
transfer their loses to any nonnegligent person remotely connec-
ted with the product who is not of the chosen. This, despite 
equal protection guarantees of the state and federal constitu-
tions. 
POINT IV 
FAIRWAY'S ASSERTION THAT DIEHL DID NOT ADE-
QUATELY OBJECT TO INSTRUCTION 15 IS WITHOUT 
MERIT. 
Diehl's objection to Instruction 15 was as follows: 
MR. DRANEY: On behalf of defendants, Diehl Lumber 
Company, your Honor, we would like to make the follow-
ing exceptions to the jury instructions of the Court 
as indicated that it would give. 
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First of all, Instruction No. 15. This was 
an instruction submitted by the plaintiffs and it 
states: 'The law involved in this lawsuit is known as 
the law of strict products liability. Pursuant to this 
law, manufacturers, distributors, brokers, as well as 
all other parties in the chain of distribution are 
strictly liable for damages caused by defectively 
designed products.' 
THE COURT: Can I ask you not to read it. Just 
state your objections. 
MR. DRANEY; All right. I apologize, your Honor. 
I went through an appeal where there was some confusion 
about the number and that's the reason why, 
THE COURT: All right. If you feel like you need 
to, go ahead. 
MR. DRANEY: 'This is true so long as that party 
is in the business of, and gains profit from, distri-
buting or otherwise disposing of the "product" in 
question through the stream of commerce.' 
I think I read enough so we can find it and 
understand what instruction we are talking about. 
Particularly take exception, your Honor, to the part 
that says, 'The primary justification for extending 
strict liability to all in the chain of distribution 
is to provide the "maximum of protection" to the 
consumer.' 
Maximum protection is in quotes. I think 
that misstates the law. I think strict liability was 
intended to relieve plaintiffs of a burden of proof 
and I don't think that that is the only consideration 
it implies. It says, 'This policy is as applicable to 
those who never handle or control the product, as it 
is to those who do possess or control the product.' 
Again, one of the issues we are talking about 
here is a broker and whether a broker possesses a 
product, he dos control it and if we didn't control it 
in some sense, then we are not responsible in strict 
liability. This says that we are. 
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It goes on to say, 'In either case, 
consumer' — 
THE COURT: I don't think you need to give all of 
your argument before me. 
MR. DRANEY: I am not. I am just trying to make 
my record. I am not trying to argue, your Honor. 
THE COURT: I understand, but I think you only 
have to object to the instruction just briefly, don't 
you? 
MR. DRANEY: No. I think you have to state the 
grounds, your Honor. You do have to state your grounds 
to protect your record. 
It says, 'In either case, consumer protec-
tion is the ultimate factor considered.' I think this 
emphasis or it tries to imply to the jury that they can 
disconcern themselves with all of the other facts and 
to get to the heart of it and that is, pay these people 
because they had a product that didn't work right. I 
think there's more to it than that. I think it mis-
states the law and I think it's misleading, your Honor. 
Diehl's objection was certainly clear enough to convey to 
the district court Diehl's objection that the "ultimate factor" 
language encouraged the jury to ignore all else, except that 
which was good for the "consumer." The instruction directed a 
verdict against Diehl. 
POINT V 
FAIRWAY'S CLAIM THAT DIEHL WAS "AFFORDED THE 
OPPORTUNITY TO FULLY LITIGATE THE ISSUE OF 
TRUSWAL'S FAULT AT TRIAL" IS IN ERROR. 
The district excused Truswal from trial without entering a 
default judgment on the cross-claim or determining whether the 
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settlement between Truswal and Fairway complied with the 
statutes covering contribution among joint tortfeasors. The 
district court had indicated it would not submit Truswal's 
negligence to the jury, until it reversed itself only the 
morning before the case was submitted to the jury. When the 
case was submitted to the jury, the court refused to give a 
simple instruction outlining Diehl's claims against Truswal 
(Tr. 452). Parties are entitled to have their case presented 
to the jury. E.g., Goode v. Dayton Disposal, Inc., 738 P.2d 
638 (Utah 1987). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment against Diehl should 
be reversed with instructions to the district court to enter a 
judgment of no cause of action in favor of Diehl. In the alter-
native, this matter should be reversed^ for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this Z3~^~~ aay 0f Jatiuary, 1989. 
E. Draney 




In the District Court of the Second Judicial District 
IN AND POR THE 
County of Davis, State of Utah 
FAIRWAY DISTRIBUTION CO., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BANGERTER CONSTRUCTION, et al., 
Defendants. 
RULING ON MOTION TO 
FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 37017 
The plaintiff's motion to file an amended complaint came be-
fore the court on August 13, 1985, with Merlin 0. Baker appearing 
for the plaintiff and David S. Cook appearing for the defendant. 
After oral argument, the court took the motion under advisement. 
Courts should liberally grant motions to amend complaints. 
However, this liberality is not absolute. In this case, the de-
fendants have challenged the plaintiff's application to file such 
an amendment. This court is not satisfied it has sufficient facts 
to rule on the motion. The plaintiffs are ordered to file a veri-
fied factual statement about each party to be added, stating the 
evidence which justifies adding them as a party. In addition, the 
defendants claim the insurance company to be added is, in fact, de-
fendant's insurance company. The court will allow the plaintiff 
fifteen days to file the required statement with the court, after-
which time the court will rule on this motion. 
Dated August 23, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
ADDENDUM A 
Certificate of Mailing: 
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to Merlin 0. Baker, P. 0. 
Box 3850, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3850; David S. Cook, 85 
West 400 North, Bountiful, Utah 84010; and Max D. Wheeler, P. 
0. Box 3000, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 on August 23, 1985. 
Deputy Ciferk 
In the District Court of the Second Judicial District 
IN AND FOR THE 
County of Davis, State of Utah 
FAIRWAY DISTRIBUTION CO., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BANGERTER CONSTRUCTION, et al., 
Defendant. 
RULING ON MOTION TO 
FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 37017 
On August 23, 1985, this court ordered the plaintiffs to 
file a verified factual statement about each party to be added, 
The court allowed the plaintiffs 15 days to file the document. 
Nineteen days have passed and no document has been filed with 
the court. 
The motion to amend is denied. 
Dated September 11, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
Certificate of Mailing: 
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true^  and 
correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to Merlin 0. Baker, P. 0. 
Box 3850, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3850; David S. Cook, 85 
West 400 North, Bountiful, Utah 84010; and Max D. Wheeler, P. 0. 




MERLIN 0. BAKER (A0180) Of 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
400 Deseret Building 
79 South Main Street 
P. 0. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
FAIRWAY DISTRIBUTING CO., 
FAIRWAY LIMITED, a partnership 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
BANGERTER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY; 
JOHN MARK BANGERTER; BONNEVILLE 
ENGINEERING, INC.; TRUSWAL 
SYSTEMS, INC.; COLONIAL LUMBER, 
INC.; and DIEHL LUMBER COMPANY, 
Defendants. 




AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF 
READING PENNSYLVANIA; CNA 
INSURANCE COMPANIES, TRUCK 
INSURANCE EXCHANGE and 




MOTION TO CORRECT COURT 
ORDER OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE 
TO AMEND COMPLAINT TO 
INCLUDE A CAUSE OF ACTION 
BASED ON STRICT LIABILITY 
Civil No. CV 37017 
ADDENDUM C 
COME NOW the plaintiffs pursuant to Rule 60(b) and 
Rule 15 and move the Court to correct an Order dated September 11, 
1985, in which the Court denied plaintiffs' Motion to Amend their 
Complaint to add certain parties defendant and an Eighth Cause of 
Action based on strict liability, or in the alternative, to allow 
plaintiff to amend its Complaint to include a cause of action 
based on strict liability. As grounds for said Motion, the 
plaintiffs represent to the Court as follows: 
On July 16, 1985, the plaintiffs filed a Motion to Amend 
their Complaint to add as parties defendant James Mark Bangerter, 
d/b/a Bangerter Construction Corporation, J.C. Bangerter & Sons, 
Inc. and Bangerter Development Corporation, and to add an Eighth 
Cause of Action based on strict liability. No opposition was 
filed by any of the parties to the Motion to Amend the Complaint 
to add a strict liability count. 
At the hearing on the Motion to Amend on August 13, 1985, 
David Cook, attorney for John Mark Bangerter, appeared and opposed 
that part of the Motion to Amend which sought the joinder of 
additional parties defendants. None of the attorneys representing 
the defendants, Colonial Lumber, Inc., Diehl Lumber Company or 
Truswal Systems, Inc. appeared at the hearing to oppose the Motion 
to Amend the Complaint to add a count based on strict liability, 
nor was there any objection by David Cook to this additional cause 
of action. 
The argument before the Court involved whether or not the 
aforementioned Bangerter defendants should be added as parties 
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defendant. The Court took the Motion under advisement, and on 
August 23, 1985, issued an Order indicating that the plaintiffs 
had within 15 days to supply the factual basis upon which the 
Court could determine whether or not the additional parties should 
be added. This Order is attached as Exhibit "A". 
Subsequent to the Order of August 23, 1985, the 
plaintiffs determined that they would not seek to add the 
additional parties defendant and accordingly the Motion to Amend 
to add additional parties was moot. On September 11, 1987, the 
Court entered its Order denying plaintiffs' Motion to Amend the 
Complaint. A copy of this Order is attached as Exhibit MBM. 
Since the argument and the focus of the hearing before 
the Court had been on the joining of the additional parties, the 
plaintiffs' attorney assumed that the Motion to add the cause of 
action on strict liability had been granted and by oversight did 
not request a clarification of the Court's Order relative to the 
addition of the strict liability count inasmuch as it had not been 
opposed by any of the parties. 
The plaintiffs, in their present Complaint, have alleged 
a cause of action based upon implied warranty which is similar to 
strict liability as indicated in the case of Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. 
v, Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152 (Utah, 1979). This case also 
involved a roof collapse. 
The jury also found defendant had breached 
its implied warranty of merchantability to the 
plaintiff and that such breach proximately caused 
plaintiff damage. The elements of both actions 
[implied warranty and strict liability] are 
essentially the same and analysis for the purpose 
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of determining defenses to breach of implied 
warranty parallels that for strict products 
liability. 
Id. at 159. A copy of the Hahn case is attached as Exhibit "C" . 
The causes of action and the elements of proof of strict 
liability and implied warranty are similar. The defendants will 
not be prejudiced by the inclusion in the Complaint of a count 
based on strict liability. The Court's Order of September 11, 
1985 should be corrected to reflect that plaintiffs' Motion to 
Amend the Complaint to add a cause of action in strict liability 
should have been granted, or in the alternative, the plaintiffs 
should be allowed to amend their Complaint at this time to include 
a cause of action based on strict liability. 
DATED this |L day of June, 1987. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Merlin 0. Bakers-
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the \jQ day of June, 1987, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Correct Court 
Order or in the Alternative to Amend Complaint to Include a Cause 
of Action Based on Strict Liability was hand-delivered to: 
Shawn E. Draney, Esq. 
R. Brent Stephens, Esq. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Attorneys for Bonneville Engineering 
and Diehl Lumber 
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Phillip S. Ferguson, Esq. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
510 Clark Learning Building 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Truswal Systems, Inc. 
Don J. Hanson, Esq, 
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAN 
1300 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Third-Party Defendants 
Truck Insurance Exchange and 
Farmers Insurance Group 
Scott W. Christensen, Esq. 
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
175 South West Temple, #650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for CNA Insurance Companies 
and mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Norman O. Fox, Esq. 
686 West 3100 South 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Attorney for Colonial Lumber, Inc. 
David S. Cook 
85 West 400 North 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Attorney for Defendants 
Bangerter Construction Co. 
and John Mark Bangerter 
55b 
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In the District Court of the Second Judicial District 
IN AND FOR THE 
County of Davis, State of Utah 
FAIRWAY DISTRIBUTING, ) 
Plaintiff, ) RULING ON MOTIONS 
vs. ) 
BANGERTER CONSTRUCTION, et al., ) Civil No- 37017 
Defendants. ) 
A number of motions in this case came before the court for 
oral argument on June 23, 1987. After oral argument, the court 
took the motions under advisement. 
The plaintiff's attorney, Merlin 0. Baker, complained 
bitterly because the court had denied his motion to file an 
amended complaint. On August 23, 1985, the court gave the 
plaintiff fifteen days to file a verified factual statement 
justifying the amended complaint. No such statement was ever 
filed by the plaintiff. On September 11, 1985, the court denied 
the motion to file an amended complaint. Counsel of record at 
the time, other than plaintiff, expressed relief that strict 
liability was not going to be an issue. The intent of the court 
was not to prevent the plaintiff from being heard on a legitimate 
cause of action. The court assumed that if the plaintiff had 
been serious about the cause of action, counsel would have filed 
the required statement. Opposing counsel now cry "foul" because 
they have not prepared for trial on strict liability. 
The court grants the plaintiff's motion to amend the 
complaint to include a cause of action for strict liability. The 
plaintiff is ordered to file the amended complaint within ten 
days from today. This prejudices opposing counsel in their 
ADDENDUM D 
readiness for trial. The current trial date of July 29, 30, 31 
is vacated. A new trial date of October 28, 29, 30, 1987 at 9:00 
A. M. is ordered by the court. A new pre-trial date of October 
6, 1987, at 4:00 P. M. is ordered. 
The court is also going to sever some aspects of this case 
from the initial trial. No insurance company, as a party, will 
be involved in the initial trial. Fairway Distributing Company 
will be the plaintiff and John Mark Bangerter, Bangerter 
Construction Company, Colonial Lumber, Inc., Diehl Lumber 
Company, and Truswall Systems, Inc. will be the defendants. All 
cross-claims and counter-claims which each of these parties have 
against the others will be heard at the initial trial. 
The plaintiff is still ordered to prepare a pre-trial order, 
but not until after final pre-trial on October 6, 1987. 
The court will separately rule on defendant, Bangerter's 
motion for summary judgment when time allows. Other motions will 
likewise be ruled on or delayed until the initial trial of the 
case. 
The plaintiff is ordered to draw a formal order based on 
this ruling. 
Dated July 9, 1987. 
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